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statistically significant in non-spatial regressions, the spatial regressions generally made 
the significance disappear.  Poverty appeared to depress reading and writing passage 
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1.  Introduction 
  Economists care about schooling because school quality, as measured by 
proficiency test scores, is an important predictor of labor market productivity and 
earnings (Sander, 1996; Bishop, 1989; Loury and Garman, 1995; Murnane, Willett and 
Levy 1995).  Whatever improves school quality might also improve labor market 
productivity and earnings. 
  The private sector and the government both provide primary and secondary 
schooling.  The dual provision of schooling has inevitably lead to comparisons between 
private and public schools, with many charging that private schools do a better job with 
less money.  Some economists speculate that private schools must compete for students 
and must therefore deliver a high-quality product at low cost to survive.  Public school 
systems, which have local monopoly power, are under less competitive pressure to 
deliver high-quality and efficient services (e.g., Couch, Shughart and Williams, 1993). 
  School vouchers are often proposed to increase competition.  Under the current 
system, students are assigned to tax-funded (public) schools based on their residence.  If 
students attend the schools they are assigned to, they pay no extra tuition.  But if students 
want to attend private schools or a tax-funded school other than the one they are assigned 
to, parents must continue to pay taxes for their assigned public school, and they also have 
to pay full tuition at the school they attend.   
A voucher program would lower the cost of attending another school.  Under a 
voucher program, parents receive a voucher--a check from the government--that can be 
redeemed at the assigned school or another school.  Some voucher plans restrict voucher 
use to public schools only, while other voucher plans allow recipients to use the voucher   3
at any public or private school.  A flurry of recent research uses education production 
functions to investigate the extent to which public schools respond to competition from 
other public schools and private schools.  Knowing whether public schools respond more 
to competition from other public schools or private schools, the most effective voucher 
policy may be designed.  If vouchers increase school competition, student outcomes may 
improve, and the labor force of the future may be more productive. 
  Previous research fails to address some important econometric issues.  Public 
schooling is often thought to have positive spillovers over some spatial subgroup.   
Traditional education production functions ignore the possibility of spillovers.   
Furthermore, even the most careful education production functions are subject to omitted 
variable bias.  Because of the public policy importance of the voucher issue, estimates of 
school competition must be as unbiased and efficient as possible. 
  The current study introduces the spatial education production function.  The 
spatial education production function uses spatial statistics--estimation that accounts for 
the spatial layout of the data--to address spillovers and omitted variable bias.  The study 
finds spatial effects in all sections of the Ohio proficiency test and in all 15 spatial 
regressions.  Therefore, education production functions that do not account for the spatial 
configuration of the data are vulnerable to biased, inefficient and inconsistent parameter 
estimates (Anselin, 1988).  The specific spatial models used are designed to be 
insensitive to outliers and for this reason are expected to have lower adjusted R-squared 
than non-spatial models; nevertheless, the spatial education production functions have 
higher adjusted R-square than their non-spatial counterparts, suggesting that spatial 
statistics adds to explanatory power.   4
  Most of the non-spatial regressions show a positive relationship between public 
school outcomes and the number of public school districts in the county.  Once spatial 
statistics is used to address spillovers and omitted variables, only 13% of the regressions 
show a relationship.  The magnitude of the effect is trivial:  the elasticity of test passage 
with respect to the number of public school districts is 0.026.
1  Overall, the current study 
provides weak evidence that public schools respond a little bit to competition from other 
public schools.  The results are more similar to Rothstein (2005), who finds no effect, 
than to Hoxby (2000), who finds large competitive effects. 
  A comparison of spatial and non-spatial estimation methods fails to support the 
assertion that traditional regressions bias the parameter estimate of private school 
competition downward (Hoxby, 1998).  Neither the traditional nor the spatial education 
production functions indicate a consistent public school response to competition from 
private schools.  The response is more prevalent in the non-spatial regressions (40%) than 
the spatial regressions (20%), suggesting that once spatial effects are considered, the 
correlation between private school attendance and public school outcomes is weakened. 
In fact, when the result is significant, it is almost always negative.  The implications for 
allowing vouchers at private schools are discussed. 
 
2.  Theoretical model of school competition 
The main contribution of the paper is its novel application of an empirical 
technique and the results it yields about school competition; still, some researchers find it 
useful to couch empirical work in a theoretical framework that motivates the statistical 
test.  A theoretical model of the production of education with spillovers is now presented.    5
It is based on Murdoch, Rahmatian and Thayer (1993) but deviates in several respects.
2  
The model abstracts from many of the complex issues involved in education; its purpose 
is to motivate the use of spatial statistics in the empirical section by showing that there 
may be spillovers between school districts.   
Each school district i undertakes an activity α, the provision of schooling, which 
is measured by proficiency test passage rates.  Production takes the following form: 
αi = αi(di, Ψi, bi)      ( 1 )  
where d is a vector of student and parent demographic characteristics, Ψ is a vector of 
community demographic characteristics, and b is school board administrative efficiency 
and effectiveness.  In turn,  
bi = bi(ki, ei(ki), si)      ( 2 )  
where k is a vector of variables related to competition in the schooling market, e is 
enrollment, and s is a vector of inputs chosen by the school board such as teacher quality 
and the pupil/teacher ratio.  Vector s is chosen in a framework outside the current model, 
but it is flexible enough to incorporate either rent-seeking or output-maximizing behavior 
by the administration.  
  Education is assumed to exhibit positive externalities (Wyckoff, 1984); therefore, 
although the median voter chooses α, the total amount of schooling consumption γ is the 
following: 
γi = αi + ωi      (3) 
where ω are spill-ins from public schooling provision in neighboring communities.  The 
median voter’s utility is a function of the total amount of schooling consumption, 
regardless of its source.  Therefore,   6
Ui = Ui(ni, γi)      ( 4 )  
Equation (4) portrays the median voter’s utility as a function of consumption of a 
numeraire good n as well as public schooling.  The utility function is assumed to be 
strictly quasi-concave, twice continuously differentiable, and a monotonically increasing 
function of its arguments.   
  School district i not only receives spill-ins from neighboring communities; it 
generates them as well.  When the median voter chooses α, part of that provision is 
privately consumed.  Another part is the pure public portion of schooling, consumed by 
the community in question as well as by its neighbors.  Formally, 
αi = ti + pi        ( 5 )  
where t is the community’s own provision of the public aspect of schooling, and p is 
consumption of the pure private portion of schooling.   
The proportion of a community’s provision of public schooling that stays in the 
community and the proportion that spills over into neighboring school districts is 
described by the following joint product technology: 
pi = θi * αi        (6) 
ti = φi * αi        (7) 
where θ is the proportion of own provision of schooling that is privately consumed and φ 
is the fraction that is a pure public good.  Equation (7) holds for all school districts, so 
ωi =  φr * αr            (8)  ∑
≠i r
where φr is the fraction of activity in school district r that spills in to jurisdiction i as a 
public good.  Because γi = ti + pi + ωi, equation (4) may be rewritten as  
Ui = Ui(ni, ti + pi + ωi)                         (9)   7
The median voter maximizes (9) subject to the following budget constraint: 
yi = ni + τiαi      (10) 
In equation (10), y is income and τ is the per-unit cost of education faced by the median 
voter.  The median voter chooses α taking other districts’ schooling decisions as given.  
Constrained maximization proceeds by setting up the Lagrangian, 
L = Ui(ni, φi * αi + θi * αi +  φr * αr) + λ(yi – ni - τiαi)        (11)  ∑
≠i r
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.  Partial differentiation yields the following first-order 










∂ (θi + φi) - τiλ = 0              (13) 
so that the ratio of the marginal rates of substitution of the numeraire good and own 










∂  = τi      ( 1 4 )  
  The theoretical model has shown how spillovers may be involved in the 
production of education and how the spillovers enter communities’ choice of schooling 
levels.  The theoretical model contains variables representing student and parent 
characteristics, community characteristics and school-specific inputs.  The following 
section discusses the inputs to education in greater detail to justify the choice of variables 
in the empirical section. 
  
3.  Literature review and choice of education production function variables   8
  Education is produced using the following inputs:  students and parents, the 
community, and school-specific factors.  Each input group is discussed in turn.  Every 
attempt is made to include the typical set of education production function variables as 
well as variables related to competition. 
  Student and parent characteristics are typically strongly related to public school 
outcomes.  One such characteristic is the presence of a two-parent household.  A single-
parent household may not devote as much attention to its children; therefore, %BOTH 
PARENTS is expected to be positively related to student outcomes.  Another 
theoretically important household characteristic is income.  PARENT INCOME is 
expected to be positively related to student achievement.  On the other hand, low parent 
education levels may imply that parents are less able to help their children with their 
homework or that they do not value education highly.  %NO DIPLOMA and %HS 
DIPLOMA ONLY are therefore likely to be negatively related to student outcomes, 
compared with higher levels of parent education.  The proportion of nonwhite students, 
%MINORITY, is also included; it has been found negatively related to school outcomes 
in many education production functions. 
  Characteristics of the community include demographic factors and variables 
related to competition.  The proportion of school district residents who are living in 
poverty, %POVERTY, is expected to be negatively related to school outcomes.   
Competitive pressures may also influence the supply of public school quality.   
Competition may come from private schools as well as from other public schools.  Each 
of these possibilities is discussed in turn.   9
Theoretical models have found positive (Falkinger, 1994), negative (Epple and 
Romano, 1998) and ambiguous (Ireland, 1990) effects of increased private school 
enrollment on public school performance.  Empirical studies have shown more consistent 
results.  Couch, Shughart and Williams (1993) find the percentage of students in a public 
school district who attend private schools has a positive relationship with standardized 
algebra test scores in North Carolina’s public schools; public schools seem to respond to 
competition from private schools.  Borland and Howsen (1996) extend Couch, Shughart 
and Williams’ analysis to include the effect of both public and private school competition 
on public school performance.  This competition from both sources is captured in a single 
Herfindahl index, which is positively related to public school performance.  Hoxby 
(1998, 1997) also finds competition from private schools is positively related to higher 
public school achievement.  Dee (1998) shows that competition from private schools has 
a positive and statistically significant impact on high school graduation rates of 
neighboring public schools.  In contrast, Zanzig (1997) finds a negative relationship 
between public school math test scores and the percentage of students in the county who 
attend private schools.  %PRIVATE is included in the current study to capture the 
relationship between private school competition and public school performance.  
There may also be competition between public schools.  Hoxby (1998, 1996) says 
such competition should exist because efficient and high-quality education providers are 
rewarded with higher budgets.  An increase in quality causes an increase in house prices, 
which increases the tax base, tax collections, and the size of the school budget.  In 
addition, Hoxby suggests schools are more responsive to parents’ desires as opposed to 
school staff desires when there are many public school districts in the area.  Hoxby   10
further asserts that when parents have more choice among districts, they are more 
involved in their children’s schooling.  One may expect a positive relationship between 
the number of school districts and public school outcomes, then.  Indeed, Hoxby (1998, 
2000) finds such a relationship.  Using a Herfindahl index to measure competition, she 
finds an increase in competition is associated with a small but statistically significant 
increase in achievement.  In contrast, when Rothstein (2005) uses Hoxby’s (2000) data 
with different instruments, he finds no statistically significant results.  Rothstein further 
suggests that Hoxby’s failure to control for private school attendance led to her finding 
about public school competition.  Zanzig (1997) generally finds that the number of public 
school districts in a county has a positive effect on public school performance until a 
threshold of three or four districts is reached.  Beyond this threshold additional public 
schools depress performance.  Based on the literature, the number of public school 
districts in each of Ohio’s eighty-eight counties, #DISTRICTS, is included to capture 
public school competition. 
  Finally, the characteristics of the schools themselves may influence student 
achievement.  There are dissenters (Ornstein, 1993; Fowler and Walberg, 1991; Jewell, 
1989), but considerable evidence suggests that larger school districts are consistently 
negatively related to student outcomes, although the magnitude is small (Haller, 1992; 
Stern, 1989; Friedkin and Necochea, 1988; Brasington, 1997).  Therefore, COHORT 
SIZE is included in the education production function; a negative relationship with 
student performance is anticipated.  Other school-specific characteristics include 
TEACHER SALARY, TEACHER EXPERIENCE, and TEACHER EDUCATION 
levels, as well as the PUPIL/TEACHER RATIO.  Although the debate continues as to the   11
significance of these factors, no education production function is complete without them.  
Data on per pupil expenditures is also available, but this variable is highly correlated with 
TEACHER SALARY (0.81) and PUPIL/TEACHER RATIO (-0.89) and seems to cause 
multicollinearity problems.   
  The student outcomes are now described.  Ohio’s high school students must pass 
a ninth-grade proficiency test to receive a full high school diploma.  Students who do not 
pass this test by the end of twelfth grade but pass their coursework receive a certificate of 
attendance instead.  All students must take the test, so sample selection bias is not an 
issue (Hanushek and Taylor, 1990).
3  The 1993 proficiency test contains four sections:  
writing, reading, math, and citizenship.  The measures of school outcome employed are 
the proportion of ninth-graders in each district who pass each portion of the ninth-grade 
proficiency test in 1993.  Of the 611 Ohio school districts, 605 reported their 1993 
proficiency test results.   
The recent education production literature includes studies that use levels of 
outcomes (Hoxby, 1996; Sander, 1996; Kennedy and Siegfried, 1997; Zanzig, 1997; Dee, 
1998; Couch, Shughart and Williams, 1993; Borland and Howsen, 1996) as well as the 
value-added approach (Meyer, 1996; Hanushek, 1992; Gomes-Neto, Hanushek, Leite and 
Frota-Bezzera, 1997; Figlio, 1999).  Two ways of implementing value added were   tried.  
The value added approach of Meyer (1996) yielded no additional insights; the approach 
of Hayes and Taylor (1996) yielded an adjusted R-squared of 0.01.  The current study 
therefore restricts its attention to variation in the level of outcomes, rather than value 
added.  The results of the current study complement Brasington and Haurin (2005), who 
find that levels of proficiency are valued by the housing market, while measures of the   12
value added of a school are not.  Variables’ definitions, sources and means are shown in 
Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
4.  Traditional, non-spatial estimation 
Theory provides no guide as to the functional form the education production 
function should take (Figlio, 1999).  Furthermore, a Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) 
test for linearity versus loglinearity yields inconclusive results; the linear functional form 
is adopted by default.   
It is only in the last few years that the economics of education literature has 
addressed endogeneity in education production functions (Akerhielm, 1995; Sander, 
1999; Hoxby, 1998).  From the school district’s point of view, TEACHER SALARY and 
PUPIL/TEACHER RATIO are choice variables and should be treated endogenously.   
TEACHER EXPERIENCE and TEACHER EDUCATION are related to how long a 
teacher has been in the school district.  These variables are likely simultaneously 
determined with student achievement and are therefore treated endogenously.   
Hoxby (1998) suggests that #DISTRICTS is endogenous to school quality, and 
the number of streams in the area should be used as an instrument.  Hoxby also suggests 
that %PRIVATE is endogenous to public school quality.  However, there is some 
evidence that school district consolidation is not a function of public school quality 
(Brasington, 1999); therefore, the number of school districts in an area is not a function 
of school quality.  In addition, a Hausman test reveals that both #DISTRICTS and   13
%PRIVATE may be treated exogenously in the education production function.
4  
Rothstein (2005) also argues in favor of treating #DISTRICTS as an exogenous variable. 
 
5.  The spatial education production function 
The theoretical model of school district competition includes educational 
spillovers.  In fact, a good deal of research has investigated spillovers in public good 
provision.
5  A natural way to account for externalities is to incorporate spatial 
autocorrelation in the statistical estimation:  rarely do economic theory and statistical 
technique complement each other so naturally.
6 
When each school district affects the performance of neighboring school districts, 
spatial autocorrelation may exist (LeSage, 1997a).  Ordinary least squares does not 
account for the interplay between spatially close observations, which may lead to biased, 
inefficient and inconsistent parameter estimates (Anselin, 1988).  Neighboring school 
districts affect each other more than school districts far away from each other (Wyckoff, 
1984); consequently, a spatial weights matrix must be constructed to summarize the 
spatial configuration of the observations.  The traditional education production function 
takes the following form: 
tij = βxi + εi      (15) 
where t represents test passage, i is school district i, j is test section j, x is the set of 
student, parent, community and school-specific factors related to test passage, and ε is the 
error term.   
  But the traditional education production function ignores spillovers and other 
forms of spatial dependence.  We first employ the Bayesian spatial error model of   14
LeSage (1997b) to address heteroskedasticity, outliers, and omitted variables.  It is the 
same as the traditional model in Equation (15), but with a more complex error term: 
tij = βxi + εi         (16) 
  ε = λWε + µ, µ ∼ N(0,σ
2V )       
  V = diag(v1, v2,…, vn)        
 r/vi ∼ χ
2( r )   /   r        
 1/σ
2 ∼ Γ(η,δ)       
In Equation (16), ε is a spatial autoregressive error term that says the error term 
for each observation is related to the error terms of the neighboring observations.  Unlike 
time series, where an autoregressive lag represents nearby time periods, the λWε is an 
autoregressive lag based on nearby observations in space.  The W in the autoregressive 
term is a spatial weight matrix (LeSage, 1997a) that summarizes the spatial layout of the 
data on a map.  It tells who the nearest school districts are for each observation.  The 
spatial weights matrix W in the current study is constructed so that the five nearest 
neighbors are allowed to influence each school district.  With 605 school districts in the 
sample, W is a 605x605 matrix.  Row 1 represents school district 1.  For each column y 
in row 1 we must ask, “Is school district y one of the five nearest to school district 1?”  If 
the answer is yes, the column gets a 1; if not, the column gets a 0.
7  Each row has five 
1’s, then.  A common procedure in the spatial statistics literature is to make the sum of 
each row equal unity, so with five neighbors each neighbor is assigned a weight of 1/5 = 
0.2.     15
The λ in Equation (16) is the spatial autoregressive parameter to be estimated.  It 
tells the degree to which the error terms of our observation and its neighbors are related. 
Finally, µ is a white noise error term.   
  The first two terms in Equation (16) describe a spatial error model.
8  T h e  
remaining terms distinguish the Bayesian model from the non-Bayesian spatial error 
model.  The additional characterization of the error term helps correct for 
heteroskedasticity and outliers, and is discussed in greater detail in LeSage (1999), but a 
brief discussion is provided here.  A big difference between Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
estimation is the use of prior information.  We allow diffuse priors for λ, β, and σ
2.  
Ordinarily, the term r in Equation (16) would be distributed gamma with two parameters.  
Instead, following LeSage (1999, p. 121), we use an informative prior on vi of r = 4.  This 
particular prior yields relatively constant estimates of vi in the presence of 
homoskedasticity, while at the same time accommodating non-constant error variances in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and outliers.
9  Computational tricks by Barry and Pace 
(1999) and Pace and Barry (1998) are used to allow the sample to run in a reasonable 
amount of time.
10 
The spatial error model captures the influence of omitted variables that vary 
across space.  Any omitted influence that varies across space will be subsumed in the 
error term, and the spatial autoregressive term will capture these influences.  The income 
of parents and race of the students are included, but the education production functions 
do not measure the income and racial characteristics of the neighborhood.  These 
community characteristics may affect student performance above and beyond the 
influence from the parents, perhaps through volunteering efforts and tax levy passage.    16
Neighborhood crime rates are also omitted, and the accompanying feeling of security 
could affect student performance.  These omitted influences will be subsumed in the error 
term, and normally might adversely influence parameter estimates.  But the second term 
in Equation (16) recognizes the correlation between the error terms of neighboring school 
districts.  If people live in areas with similar people, then income, race, and crime rates 
will be similar across space, and change character gradually from school district to school 
district.  If the error term for school district A is affected by income, race, and crime 
rates, the error term for nearby school district B is affected to a similar degree.  The 
correlation between the error terms is captured by the spatial model.  In this manner the 
spatial error model addresses the influence of omitted variables in the house price 
hedonic.  A more complete intuitive explanation of how spatial statistics addresses 
omitted variables is found in Brasington and Hite (2005).  A mathematical proof is 
available in Griffith (1988, p. 94-107). 
  The Bayesian spatial error model in Equation (16) depends on having a large 
number of draws to converge to the true joint posterior distribution of the parameters.  
With insufficient draws, parameter estimates cannot be trusted.  Although convergence 
diagnostics are available, the true test of convergence is when the estimates don’t change 
with added draws.  A model with 300 draws (with 30 additional burn-in draws) achieves 
similar results to a model with 1000 draws (with 100 additional burn-in draws), 
suggesting that 300 draws is sufficient. 
  There are other ways in which spatial statistics can capture the influence of 
omitted variables.  One of these is a Bayesian spatial autoregressive model (LeSage, 
1997b):   17
tij = ρW tij+ βxi + εi         (17) 
ε ∼ N(0,σ
2V )        
   V = diag(v1, v2,…, vn)       
 r/vi ∼ χ
2( r )   /   r        
      σ
2 ∼ Γ(η,δ)  
      ρ ∼ uniform(-1,1)      
In the above equation, ρWtij is the spatial autoregressive term.  It is the term that 
captures the essence of public good spillovers, allowing the educational production of 
each school district to depend on the educational production of its neighboring school 
districts.  The theoretical section modeled spillovers as part of a joint product technology, 
but there may be an additional justification for the ρWtij term.  School district 
administrators may keep their eyes on neighboring school districts and try to compete 
with them academically, so the outcomes of neighboring school districts may affect the 
administrative effort of a school district, which in turn may affect school district 
outcomes.  Administrators care less about the performance of far-away school districts.   
Compared to the Bayesian spatial error model of Equation (16), the Bayesian 
spatial autoregressive model of Equation (17) takes the influence of unobserved variables 
out of the error term ε and controls for them with the ρWtij term.  While the spatial error 
model guards against inefficient parameter estimates, the spatial autoregressive model 
guards against biased parameter estimates.  If the ρWtij term is significant, and if it were 
omitted as in a traditional education production function, the matrix of parameter 
estimates β would suffer from bias and hypothesis testing would be invalid.   18
A final way spatial dependence is captured in the education production functions 
is through a spatial Durbin model (LeSage, 1997b): 
 (I  -  ρW)tij = α + β1xi + Wβ2xi + εi       (18) 
ε ∼ N(0,σ
2V )        
   V = diag(v1, v2,…, vn)       
 r/vi ∼ χ
2( r )   /   r        
      σ
2 ∼ Γ(η,δ)  
      ρ ∼ uniform(-1,1) 
As in the spatial autoregressive model of Equation (17), the spatial Durbin model of 
Equation (18) also contains a spatial autoregressive term ρWtij and the education 
production function controls xi.  Unlike the spatial autoregressive model, the spatial 
Durbin model contains the education production function controls for our neighbors Wxi 
as well.  While the β terms are different for xi and Wxi, the same W is used in two places 
in Equation (18).  Some research (e.g., Anselin (1988)) claims the ρ and β2  are not 
identified, but Kelejian and Prucha (2004) prove they are.
11   
The Wxi term captures spillovers in a different way than the ρWtij term.  School 
quality may be more than a function of its own inputs and neighboring districts’ school 
quality.  It may also be a function of demographic influences in neighboring districts.  
Children who live on the border of two school districts may play with each other, so that 
peer group effects may spill across school district boundaries.  Churches, Rotary Clubs, 
and country clubs may draw members from different (but probably nearby) school 
districts; parents at these social organizations may discuss schooling with each other and   19
form attitudes about schooling quality, dress codes, and homework levels, which may 
influence the schooling decisions they make.  Wxi allows the characteristics of 
neighboring school districts to affect outcomes in each school district.  These spillover 
effects may be stronger across schools than across school districts, but if they are present 
across school districts then they are likely to be present across schools within a district.
12   
 
6.  Estimation results 
  The first set of regression results uses %PASS ALL, the percentage of students 
passing all four sections of the proficiency test, as the dependent variable.  The first set of 
results in Table 2 is the non-spatial instrumental variables model.   
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The results of the instrumental variables model are generally consistent with 
expectations.  Proficiency test passage is higher, all else constant, in school districts 
where children come from two-parent families, with high incomes, with a low proportion 
of minority students, and in communities with low poverty rates and higher-educated 
citizens.  The sign of COHORT SIZE is negative, but fails to achieve statistical 
significance at the 0.10 level.  Most of the school-specific inputs show a significant 
relationship with student achievement, but two of these are of theoretically inconsistent 
sign.  While school districts with better-paid teachers have higher passage rates, the 
results suggest the school districts with higher teacher education levels have lower 
passage rates, and a higher student/teacher ratio raises passage rates.  A correlation 
matrix suggests the results are not an artifact of multicollinearity.  Consistent with 
competitive effects, #DISTRICTS is positively related to passage rates.  However,   20
%PRIVATE is negatively related to passage rates in public school districts, a result in 
contrast with most of the literature, but consistent with Zanzig (1997). 
  But the preceding analysis does not address spillovers or omitted variables.  The 
results of the first spatial education production functions are reported in the remaining 
columns of Table 2.
13 
Testing for spatial effects is of supreme importance.  The spatial error lag has a 
parameter estimate of 0.36 and is statistically significant.  In fact, the spatial parameter 
estimates are all positive and statistically significant throughout the paper, suggesting that 
the use of spatial statistics is warranted.  The 0.36 estimate means the error terms have on 
average a 0.36 spatial correlation with each other:  the unmeasured things in our 
education production function are somewhat similar to the unmeasured things of our 
neighbors.  The next model, the spatial autoregressive model, suggests that the average 
correlation between one school district’s passage rate and its neighbors’ passage rates is 
0.26, and the spatial Durbin model suggests this correlation is 0.28.
14  The spatial Durbin 
model also finds that three of the explanatory variables of our neighbors help explain the 
proficiency passage rate of our school district.  It is difficult to compare the results of 
Millimet and Rangaprasad (2005) because 1) they do not use proficiency tests as 
measures of school quality, and 2) they do not use the same spatial models and so have 
no estimates of λ or β2.  Millimet and Rangaprasad report the estimates of ρ when the 
measures of school quality are the pupil/teacher ratio, expenditures per pupil, capital 
expenditures per pupil, teacher salary, and school size, but the results are not comparable 
to the estimate of ρ for the proficiency test passage variables used in the current study.    21
Their estimates vary from specification to specification, as well, ranging from small and 
negative to large and positive.   
Explanatory power is higher in the spatial models.  Adjusted R-squared is 0.49 in 
the non-spatial models, while it is 0.54, 0.54, and 0.56 in the spatial models.  The 
Bayesian component of the spatial models purposefully tries not to fit outliers, which 
depresses adjusted R-squared.  If the spatial models had fit outliers like the non-spatial 
model, the difference in adjusted R-squared might be even larger.  Even if the 
improvement is modest, the larger adjusted R-squared is found in all spatial models 
throughout the study. 
Perhaps the most significant finding in Table 2 is that the spatial models eliminate 
the statistical significance of all the school-specific inputs.  Failure to incorporate spatial 
dependence seems to have attributed too much explanatory power to teacher salary, the 
pupil/teacher ratio, and teacher education levels.  The lack of significance is consistent 
with Hanushek (1986) and much of the recent literature. 
The other major differences concern the school competition variables.  Hoxby 
(1998) argues that the parameter estimate of %PRIVATE is biased downward, but the 
spatial models that address the influence of omitted variables suggest otherwise.  The 
non-spatial model’s parameter estimate was -0.19, but the parameter estimates of the 
spatial models range from -0.15 to -0.12, suggesting (if anything) an upward bias to least 
squares.  And while the non-spatial model showed a significant relationship for 
%PRIVATE, only one of the three spatial models shows a statistically significant 
relationship, and that barely reaches the 0.10 level of significance.  In any case, even the 
largest parameter estimate -0.19 yields an elasticity of -0.02, so regardless of statistical   22
significance, the economic significance of competitive effects from private schools is 
negligible. 
The results for the relationship between public school competition are similar to 
those for private school competition.  While the instrumental variables regression shows 
a positive, significant relationship, the spatial models generally find no relationship.   
Again, the only spatial model showing a significant relationship is the spatial 
autoregressive model.  And again, the magnitude of the parameter estimate, even for the 
largest parameter estimate, shows a trivial elasticity of test passage with respect to the 
number of school districts of 0.04. 
The enrollment of each grade is negatively related to test passage in two of the 
three spatial models and approaches significance in the third; it was insignificant in the 
non-spatial model.  The elasticity is -0.03, and is almost exclusively found when %PASS 
ALL is used, findings consistent with Brasington (1997).  
Table 3 shows the results of regressions when the percentage of students passing 
the math section is the dependent variable. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Passage rates on the math section are lower than for other sections, so it is not surprising 
that the results are similar to the %PASS ALL results:  if a student failed any section, it 
most likely was the math section.  But while parent income was related to %PASS ALL 
in three of four regressions, it is not related to %PASS MATH in any regression.  The 
only role for parent income is found in the spatial Durbin model, where LAG PARENT 
INCOME is positively related to %PASS MATH.  The parameter estimate (not shown) is 
0.29, suggesting that the elasticity of our own math passage rate with respect to our   23
neighbors’ income levels is 0.16.  If neighboring school districts’ incomes are 10% 
higher, our math passage is 1.6% higher.  The evidence for competitive effects is stronger 
for the math model than for any other test section:  five out of eight parameter estimates 
are statistically significant.  But, as before, the magnitude of the effects is trivial.  And, as 
before, the parameter estimate of %PRIVATE is weaker in the spatial models than in the 
non-spatial model. 
  As before, the non-spatial model shows significant effects for three of four school 
inputs, and two of these have an unexpected sign.  As before, incorporating spatial 
dependence kills off the statistical significance of TEACHER EDUCATION and 
PUPIL/TEACHER RATIO.  However, TEACHER SALARY remains positive and 
statistically significant in two of the three spatial models.  The median elasticity from the 
spatial models is 0.29, suggesting that a 10% rise in teacher salary is associated with a 
2.9% rise in math passage rates.  In other words, a ten percent rise in teacher salaries 
might raise the average district’s passage rate from 0.61 to 0.628. 
  COHORT SIZE is not significant in any regression, spatial or not, and 
%POVERTY, while significant in the non-spatial model, is insignificant in all spatial 
models.  The magnitude of the spatial parameters ranges from 0.23 to 0.31. 
  The results of the %PASS CITIZENSHIP regression are easily summarized. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Competitive effects are almost completely absent.  As in the math section, the incomes of 
neighbors seem to spill over and positively affect citizenship passage rates, but no direct 
relationship between parental incomes and passage rates is found.  No school input is 
statistically significant, either in the spatial or non-spatial models.  The magnitude of the   24
spatial parameters ranges from 0.17 to 0.23.  Adjusted R-squared shows its largest leap 
by going from 0.44 in the non-spatial model to 0.55 in the spatial Durbin model. 
  The results of the %PASS READING model are similar to those of the %PASS 
CITIZENSHIP model.   
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
There is no evidence of competitive effects or of the importance of any school input to 
test passage rates.  Parent income shows up insignificant in the non-spatial model, but 
becomes statistically significant in all spatial models.  And while %POVERTY is 
statistically significant in the non-spatial model, when spatial dependence is addressed, it 
loses its significance.  The spatial parameters range from 0.17 to 0.26. 
  The model with %PASS WRITING shows almost nothing of statistical 
significance. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Adjusted R-squared ranges from 0.21 in the non-spatial model to 0.25 in the spatial 
Durbin model.  The lack of significance and low adjusted R-squared may stem from the 
way the writing section is graded.  Unlike the other test sections, the writing section is not 
a multiple choice test.  The tests are sent out of state and hand-graded.  The passage rates 
are high:  the average passage rate of this section is 0.87, and the standard deviation is 
0.08.  The lack of variation contributes to the lack of statistically significant findings.  
Still, the spatial parameters range from 0.17 to 0.20, similar to those of the other test 
sections, and three spatial lags are significant in the spatial Durbin model.  And, as in the 
reading section, %POVERTY appears significant until spatial dependence is addressed. 
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7.  Conclusion 
Educational spillovers have been discussed theoretically for a long time, but no 
one has accounted for them in empirical estimations of local public schooling provision.
15  
Significant spatial effects are present in all fifteen spatial education production functions, 
with spatial parameter estimates that range from 0.17 to 0.36.  Researchers who ignore 
the spatial nature of the data run the risk of having biased, inefficient and inconsistent 
parameter estimates (Anselin, 1988).  Researchers should account for spillovers in the 
production of education and omitted variable bias by incorporating spatial statistics.  In 
addition to more accurate parameter estimates, the spatial models add to the explanatory 
power of education production functions.  Despite the use of spatial Bayesian techniques 
that mitigate the fitting of outliers, average adjusted R-squared improves from 0.42 to 
0.46. 
The influence of competition on public school performance is the focus of the 
education production functions.  Most recent education production function studies find 
that public schools respond to competition from private schools (Hoxby 1998, 1997; Dee, 
1998; Couch, Shughart and Williams 1993; Borland and Howsen, 1996).  The current 
study disagrees.  There seems to be no consistent association between private school 
attendance rates and public school achievement.  Furthermore, although there is always a 
positive relationship between the number of public school districts in a county and public 
school test scores, it is only statistically significant in eight of the twenty regressions.  
The magnitude of its effect is paltry, too, never exceeding 0.05.
16  
At first glance, such slight competitive effects suggest that school vouchers will 
not markedly improve public school performance; consequently, vouchers will probably   26
not improve labor force productivity or earnings either.  If so, vouchers may only serve to 
subsidize rich parents.  Willms and Echols (1992) find that Scottish parents with high 
socio-economic status were the ones who took advantage of Britain’s school voucher 
system.  If only rich parents use the vouchers, the vouchers will be used to make tuition 
at other schools more affordable for those most able to afford it.   
But these findings must be interpreted carefully.  The data are real.  As such, they 
represent the current competitive environment in education.  And, as the results of the 
current study confirm, the current environment can hardly be described as competitive.  
To the extent that they can afford it, parents choose where to live in part based on the 
quality of school their house is assigned to.  But other considerations are involved:  taxes, 
convenience to work, pollution, availability of parks, and quality of housing stock all may 
be more important to parents than school quality.  And the quality of schools may change 
over time, but high moving costs inhibit relocation.  Residents whose children graduate 
may stop volunteering at the schools and approving school tax levies.  And the tax laws 
make it costly to attend private schools or schools outside the attendance zone, since a 
parent must forego his tax contribution and pay full tuition at the new school as well.  
What’s more, private school competition consists predominantly of Catholic schools.   
School vouchers would make private schools more affordable, which would elicit a 
supply response that may open up a wide variety of attractive choices to parents 
(Merrifield, 2002).  So that parents who are not particularly interested in sending their 
children to Catholic schools may be more interested in sending them to a Montessori 
school that emphasizes African American culture.   27
Public economists sometimes think of education as a merit good:  a pure private 
good that is funded by taxation and provided by the local government.  Being private, its 
benefits are confined to the area in which it is produced.  The significant spatial 
parameter estimates of the current study imply that some of the benefits of schooling spill 
over into neighboring areas.  Schooling is not a merit good, then, and the presence of 
externalities means a non-optimal amount may be consumed.   
Failure to incorporate spatial statistics may lead to misleading parameter 
estimates.  Six of the eight parameter estimates for school inputs were statistically 
significant in the %PASS ALL and %PASS MATH regressions, but five of the six effects 
disappeared in the spatial models.  Poverty appeared to depress reading and writing 
passage rates, but this effect disappeared in the spatial models.  And spatial statistics 
uncovered other provocative findings, like the finding that having richer neighbors 
increases math and citizenship passage rates in our own school district. 
Having found evidence of spillovers in education production functions, labor and 
education economists are exhorted to use spatial statistics in their estimations.  Public and 
urban economists who deal with schooling in estimations are encouraged to do the same.  
Furthermore, significant spatial effects may be present in the demand for and supply of 
other publicly provided commodities like crime prevention, pollution abatement, garbage 
collection, libraries, and parks.  Additional research is required.  Pending these 
investigations, much of the empirical economic literature of the last thirty years may need 
to be redone to address the spatial nature of the data.   28
 
Table 1 
Variable Definitions, Sources, and Means 
Variable  Definition and Source  Mean (σ) 
%PASS ALL  Proportion of ninth-grade students passing all sections 
of the ninth-grade proficiency test (math, citizenship, 
reading and writing) in each school district in 1993 (1) 
0.51 
(0.14) 
%PASS MATH  Proportion  of  ninth-grade students passing the math 
section of the ninth-grade proficiency test in each 
school district in 1993 (1) 
0.61 
(0.14) 
%PASS  CITIZENSHIP  Proportion of ninth-grade students passing the 
citizenship section of the ninth-grade proficiency test in 
each school district in 1993 (1) 
0.72 
(0.12) 
%PASS READING  Proportion of ninth-grade students passing the reading 
section of the ninth-grade proficiency test in each 
school district in 1993 (1) 
0.87 
(0.07) 
%PASS WRITING  Proportion of ninth-grade students passing the writing 
section of the ninth-grade proficiency test in each 
school district in 1993 (1) 
0.87 
(0.08) 
%BOTH PARENTS  Proportion  of  students  in each school district living 
with two parents in 1990 (2) 
0.81 
(0.09) 
PARENT  INCOME  Average parental income of students in each school 
district, in hundreds of thousands of dollars in 1990 (2) 
0.33 
(0.11) 
%PRIVATE  Proportion of students in grades nine through twelve 
living in each public school district who attend non-
public schools in 1990 (2) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
%MINORITY  Proportion of students in each school district who are 
nonwhite in 1993 (1)  
0.06 
(0.12) 
COHORT SIZE  Average number of students in each grade in each high 
school in 1993 in thousands; school district fall average 
daily membership divided by the number of grade 
levels the school district serves, divided by the number 
of high schools the district has, divided by 1000 (1,3) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
TEACHER  SALARY  Average teacher salary in each school district in 





Average teacher experience in each school district in 





Total average daily membership in each school district 
divided by the total number of classroom teachers, in 
hundreds of students per teacher in 1993 (1)  
0.19 
(0.02) 
TEACHER EDUCATION  Number of teachers with a Masters degree divided by 
the total number of regular teachers in each school 
district in 1993 (1) 
0.33 
(0.05) 
%POVERTY  Proportion of persons in each school district living  0.10   29
under the official poverty income level in 1990 (2)  (0.07) 
#DISTRICTS  Number of school districts in each county in 1993, in 
hundreds of districts (4) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
%NO DIPLOMA  Proportion  of  parents  of school-age children in each 




%HS DIPLOMA ONLY  Proportion  of  parents of school-age children in each 
school district in 1990 who have a high school diploma 
but have not attended college (2) 
0.45 
(0.11) 
LAG  ---  Spatial lag Wx of the variable in question for the 
spatial Durbin model of Equation (18) 
- 
- 
Notes:  Means are shown with standard deviation in parentheses below.  Number of observations 
is 605.  Sources:  (1) Ohio Department of Education, Information Management Services, (2) 
School District Data Book (MESA Group, 1994), (3) Ohio Educational Directory:  1992-1993 
School Year, (4) Ohio Department of Education, Maps of Ohio School Districts:  City, 
Exempted, Local. 
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Table 2 



























































































































































































































































Adjusted R-Square  0.49  0.54  0.54  0.56 
Number of observations = 605.  Parameter estimates shown with absolute value of t-statistic 
in parentheses below.  ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level, * = statistically significant at 
0.10 level.  Spatial parameter is ρ for both Spatial Autoregressive Model and Spatial Durbin 
Model, and λ for Spatial Error Model.  LAG --- is the estimate of the spatial lag parameter for 
Wx of each variable. 
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Table 3 










































































































































Adjusted  R-square  0.49  0.53 0.53 0.55 
Number of observations = 605.  Parameter estimates shown with absolute value of t-statistic 
in parentheses below.  ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level, * = statistically significant 
at 0.10 level.  Spatial parameter is ρ for both Spatial Autoregressive Model and Spatial 
Durbin Model, and λ for Spatial Error Model.  Spatial lags are included for Spatial Durbin 
Model but suppressed in output to save space:  LAG PARENT INCOME, LAG %NO 
DIPLOMA, and LAG %HS DIPLOMA ONLY are positive.   33
 
Table 4 










































































































































Adjusted  R-square  0.44  0.45 0.45 0.55 
Number of observations = 605.  Parameter estimates shown with absolute value of t-statistic 
in parentheses below.  ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level, * = statistically significant 
at 0.10 level.  Spatial parameter is ρ for both Spatial Autoregressive Model and Spatial 
Durbin Model, and λ for Spatial Error Model.  Spatial lags are included for Spatial Durbin 
Model but suppressed in output to save space:  LAG PARENT INCOME, LAG %NO 
DIPLOMA, and LAG %HS DIPLOMA ONLY are positive.   34
 
Table 5 










































































































































Adjusted  R-square  0.47  0.50 0.49 0.51 
Number of observations = 605.  Parameter estimates shown with absolute value of t-statistic 
in parentheses below.  ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level, * = statistically significant 
at 0.10 level.  Spatial parameter is ρ for both Spatial Autoregressive Model and Spatial 
Durbin Model, and λ for Spatial Error Model.  Spatial lags are included for Spatial Durbin 
Model but suppressed in output to save space:   LAG %BOTH PARENTS, LAG 
%MINORITY, LAG COHORT SIZE, LAG TEACHER SALARY, and LAG %HS 
DIPLOMA ONLY are positive; LAG TEACHER EDUCATION is negative.   35
 
Table 6 










































































































































Adjusted  R-square  0.21  0.23 0.22 0.25 
Number of observations = 605.  Parameter estimates shown with absolute value of t-statistic 
in parentheses below.  ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level, * = statistically significant 
at 0.10 level.  Spatial parameter is ρ for both Spatial Autoregressive Model and Spatial 
Durbin Model, and λ for Spatial Error Model.  Spatial lags are included for Spatial Durbin 
Model but suppressed in output to save space:  LAG COHORT SIZE and LAG %HS 
DIPLOMA ONLY are positive; LAG TEACHER EDUCATION is negative.   36
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1 The number quoted is from the %PASS MATH results, the set of results with the 
highest proportion of statistically significant results.  The median of the three significant 
parameter estimates is used (0.16), and the values of #DISTRICTS and %PASS MATH 
are evaluated at the sample means.  All elasticities throughout the paper are evaluated at 
sample means. 
2 Among the main differences are 1) converting from expenditures to proficiency tests as 
an outcome measure, 2) including variables for student and parent demographic 
characteristics, community demographic characteristics, variables related to competition, 
school characteristics, enrollment, and school board administrative efficiency and 
effectiveness, and 3) deriving first-order conditions from the model. 
3 Only students assessed to have a learning disability are exempt.  Only if a student’s 
team leader determines that the student has a learning disability each year and exempts 
that student every year of his or her high school career will that student not be required to 
take the proficiency test. 
4 The form of the Hausman test is that detailed in Maddala (1992) and Ramanathan 
(1988).  Specifically, education production functions are run with and without the 
predicted values of #DISTRICTS and %PRIVATE.  The calculated F statistic is 1.89 
compared to a critical value of 2.30 at the 0.10 level of significance, suggesting that 
#DISTRICTS and %PRIVATE may be treated exogenously.  In unreported regressions, 
#DISTRICTS and %PRIVATE are treated endogenously, yielding somewhat larger 
parameter estimates for the two variables but no change in statistical significance 
5 See Bradford and Oates (1974), Voβ (1991), and Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) for 
surveys.  See also Murdoch, Rahmatian and Thayer (1993), Wyckoff (1984), and 
Edwards (1986). 
6 Murdoch, Rahmatian and Thayer (1993) use a spatial autoregressive model to capture 
spillovers in recreation expenditures in Los Angeles.  Brasington and Hite (2005) use a 
spatial Durbin model to capture spillovers in environmental quality, and Millimet and 
Rangaprasad (2005) use spatial statistics to model spillovers in educational input hiring. 
7 The spatial statistics literature commonly assumes that an observation cannot be its own 
neighbor, so that the spatial weights matrix has a zero diagonal.  Also, just like there is no 
consensus on functional form in traditional regressions there is no consensus on the   40
                                                                                                                                                                             
number of neighbors to use in spatial statistics, and the choice of the number of neighbors 
often affects estimation results.  Five neighbors are chosen in the current study because, 
looking at a map of Ohio’s school districts, it seems that on average each school district 
shares a border with five other school districts. 
8 If V is a matrix of ones, the first two terms of Equation (16) fully characterize a non-
Bayesian spatial error model. 
9 An alternative is to set the two parameters of the gamma distribution for r to the 
informative priors of 8 and 2.  Nearly identical estimates are achieved either way. 
10 For example, the Bayesian spatial error model with 300 draws and 30 burn-in draws, 
using %PASS MATH as dependent variable, took 629 seconds. 
11 Kelejian and Prucha (2004) prove this for a model with both a spatial autoregressive 
lag term ρWt and  λWε, but the results should follow for the spatial Durbin model as 
well. 
12 School outcomes are not available in Ohio at the school level, just at the school district 
level.  For high schools, this may not matter much, as most school districts have one high 
school.  For example, even among the urban school districts only 24 of the 140 have 
more than one high school. 
13 Millimet and Rangaprasad (2005) also have a claim to being the first, since neither of 
our papers have been published.  The first draft of this paper was completed August 5, 
1999, which may precede theirs. 
14 This is much larger than the spatial effects Murdoch, Rahmatian and Thayer (1993) 
find for recreation expenditures.  They find a very small (0.01) spatial autoregressive 
parameter estimate and statistically significant spillovers in only one of their two 
regressions. 
15 Except for the working paper by Millimet and Rangaprasad (2005). 
16 At the mean, the largest it reaches is 0.043 in the spatial Durbin model of the %PASS 
CITIZENSHIP regression. 